Xen 
 
Home About Community Support Downloads
 
   
 

xen-devel

Re: [Xen-devel] PATCH: Actually make /local/domain/$DOMID readonly to th

To: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] PATCH: Actually make /local/domain/$DOMID readonly to the guest
From: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2008 17:53:49 +0000
Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Delivery-date: Thu, 18 Dec 2008 09:53:58 -0800
Envelope-to: www-data@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <20081218174951.GZ23277@xxxxxxxxxx>
List-help: <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=help>
List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>
List-post: <mailto:xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
List-subscribe: <http://lists.xensource.com/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>, <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=subscribe>
List-unsubscribe: <http://lists.xensource.com/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>, <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=unsubscribe>
Sender: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Thread-index: AclhOZSLUDC1Veoldk6O5/dr823FDg==
Thread-topic: [Xen-devel] PATCH: Actually make /local/domain/$DOMID readonly to the guest
User-agent: Microsoft-Entourage/12.14.0.081024
On 18/12/2008 17:49, "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>> However there are other places in xend that commit the same error, and this
>> interface weakness would doubtless bite us again in future. Hence the patch
>> I actually committed (c/s 18933) actually takes a different strategy: in the
>> bowels of the xend xenstore C package I check to see if the caller is try to
>> change permissions of the node owner, and if so I fudge in dom0 as the owner
>> instead. A bit grim, but I think probably a safer bet in this instance.
> 
> I think that looks correct to me. The easy way to test is to try and
> write to '/local/domain/$DOMID/console/tty' from within the guest and
> see if it succeeds or not

Yes, I actually tested that, and it was no longer writeable. Same for a few
susceptible nodes under /vm too.

 -- Keir



_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>