Re: [Xen-devel] QEMU "drive_init()" Disk Format Security Bypass

To:	Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject:	Re: [Xen-devel] QEMU "drive_init()" Disk Format Security Bypass
From:	Eren Türkay <turkay.eren@xxxxxxxxx>
Date:	Thu, 8 May 2008 20:12:05 +0300
Cc:	xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Delivery-date:	Thu, 08 May 2008 10:12:54 -0700
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On 08 May 2008 Thu 19:58:04 Ian Jackson wrote:
> We can add a safety catch so that if what is supposedly a raw image
> looks like a cow disk, we fail, unless the rawness was explicitly
> specified.  So we can avoid data corruption although as far as I can
> see at the moment we have to at least break some existing
> deployments.

Thank you for reply.

Should I file a bug about this situation? I'm looking forward to security fix. 
Btw, KVM also fixed this vulnerability (they just pulled latest qemu code).

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