Well, either we should consistently silently mask NX, or we should
consistently fail on it. Currently the code mostly does the latter. And I
think that makes most sense, and what we're looking at here is a lack of
CPUID configurability. I'd rather see patches to fix that, so that NX is
consistently hidden, according to user preference.
-- Keir
On 28/9/07 14:23, "Dave Lively" <dlively@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> But that means you'll crash a guest that migrates from a NX-capable
> machine to a on-NX-capable machine. (Though of course this is
> detectable ahead of time, so the migration control code should just
> refuse to migrate in this case.)
>
> If we really believe that it's dangerous to let a guest see
> NX-capability that doesn't really exist, perhaps we're better off
> hiding NX altogether (perhaps optionally)? I thought over that
> beforehand, but it seemed kind of drastic to me, though I realize it's
> a much more "pure" solution in that the guest can't see
> inconsistencies due to virtualization.
>
> Dave
>
>
> On 9/28/07, Keir Fraser <Keir.Fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 27/9/07 22:12, "David Lively" <dlively@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>> The attached patch (to 3.1.1-rc2) fixes a hypervisor crash that we're
>>> seeing when migrating a HVM guest from a machine that supports the NX
>>> bit to one that doesn't (e.g., because it's disabled in the BIOS). It
>>> keeps the guest copy of EFER "as is", so the guest will see EFER_NX if
>>> it previously set it -- we just won't propagate this EFER bit to a
>>> non-NX-capable host.
>>
>> Actually this issue is very nearly handled by xen-3.1-testing:15064 and
>> xen-unstable:15066. The HVM state load code that sets guest efer should barf
>> on !cpu_has_nx && EFER_NX, just as the wrmsr-handling code does.
>>
>> -- Keir
>>
>>
>>
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>> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
>>
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